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YELLOW PERIL TURNS TO BROWN: DID JUDICIAL
XENOPHOBIA COLOR INS v. DELGADO?
I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration law reform and enforcement are among the most press-
ing concerns currently facing the United States government. Although
immigration problems have sparked substantial legislative debate and
several potential solutions have been proposed, no comprehensive plan
has yet been enacted which meets all the demands of this complex issue.
The formulation of such a plan becomes increasingly more crucial. As
Senator Edward M. Kennedy has noted:
At no time in recent years has the opportunity for action on
immigration proposals been more hopeful, or the consequences
of inaction more dangerous. Unless we are vigilant, the re-
forms of the past may be eroded by the anti-immigration senti-
ment spreading across the land.'
This xenophobia among the populace has grown more apparent as
inadequacies in immigration policies become more difficult to ignore.2
Less apparent, but of far greater concern to those who hope to effect
prompt and lasting immigration reform, is the tendency of some govern-
ment officials to allow the pressure of popular anti-alien sentiment to
color acts of the federal government.
Two recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court3 may in-
dicate a willingness on the part of a majority of the Court to shore up
weaknesses in current immigration laws at the price of abridged constitu-
tional freedoms. While one of the decisions is at least arguably based
upon purely procedural grounds,4 the plurality opinion in INS v. Del-
gado5 represents perhaps the clearest example to date of the Burger
Court's approval of the systematic limitation of constitutional protec-
1. Kennedy, Foreword, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 1 (Dec. 1981).
2. The overwhelming (70.5% to 29.5%) voter support for Proposition 38, a 1984 advi-
sory measure calling for the prohibition of languages other than English on California election
materials, is but one indication of strong anti-immigrant sentiments among the American
populace.
3. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984) (holding exclusionary rule not applica-
ble in deportation proceedings); INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1758 (1984) (holding that INS
factory surveys do not constitute seizures under the fourth amendment).
4. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3484-85. The Court's refusal to apply the exclusionary
rule in deportation hearings was based upon its characterization of such proceedings as civil in
nature, while the exclusionary rule is applicable only in criminal proceedings. Ia
5. 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:513
tions in favor of more efficient law enforcement procedures. Whether
this approval flows from a simple judicial pragmatism or from the Jus-
tices' personal xenophobic sentiments, its effect is to curtail the funda-
mental freedoms of citizens and aliens alike.'
This Note will examine the manner in which each contributing Jus-
tice applied the relevant legal precedents to the facts of Delgado. It will
demonstrate that the majority ignored important threshold inquiries, dis-
torted the factual record and misapplied precedent in order to reach its
desired conclusion. It will suggest that the Court's result-oriented deci-
sion effectively approves the systematic violation of Mexican-American
citizens' rights. It will then conclude with a brief prognosis for the future
of constitutional freedoms under a Court willing to fashion-at such a
cost-judicial remedies for problems better left to the Congress.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At issue in INS v. Delgado were three factory surveys (raids) con-
ducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in two
Southern California garment factories in 1977.' The first two surveys
were conducted pursuant to warrants issued on a showing of probable
cause to believe that illegal aliens were employed on the premises,
although no particular suspected aliens were named in either of the war-
rants.' The third survey was conducted at another garment factory with-
out a warrant, but with the consent of the factory owner.9
At the beginning of each survey INS agents stationed themselves at
building exits to prevent workers from leaving the workplace before be-
ing questioned.' ° Other agents then circulated throughout the
workforce, questioning workers regarding their citizenship." All of the
6. The fourth amendment protects lawful resident aliens as well as United States citizens.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
7. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1760 (1984).
8. These searches were conducted at Southern California Davis Pleating Company. Id.
9. The warrantless search took place at a factory called Mr. Pleat. Id. Neither the Ninth
Circuit nor the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a search justified merely by the
factory owner's consent. The circuit court noted that it need not reach this issue because it
had determined that the INS' conduct during the surveys violated the workers' fourth amend-
ment rights. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 629 (9th
Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984). Justice Brennan, dissent-
ing, was the only Supreme Court Justice to address this issue. He commented that the em-
ployer's consent to the INS' entry into the factory "does not mean that the workers'
expectation of privacy [in their workplace] evaporates." Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1774 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
10. 104 S. Ct. at 1760, 1763-64. See also id. at 1770 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
11. Id. at 1760.
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agents wore badges and were armed, but their weapons were not drawn.
The workers were asked from one to three questions relating to their
citizenship. If these questions were answered satisfactorily, the agents
moved on to question other employees. If, however, a worker gave an
unsatisfactory response or admitted that he was an alien, he was asked to
show his identification papers. 12 Arrests were made when officials had
probable cause to suspect that a worker was an illegal alien and when
workers were apprehended attempting to flee or hide from the INS
agents. 13 The three surveys yielded seventy-eight, thirty-nine and forty-
five arrests respectively. 4
Respondents, two U.S. citizens and two permanent resident aliens,
were among those questioned during the surveys.'" In 1978 the respon-
dents and their union, the International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, filed two actions in district court challenging the constitutionality
of INS factory surveys and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 6
The district court denied class certification and dismissed the union from
the suit. 1" On a series of cross-motions for summary judgment the dis-
trict court granted judgment for the INS, ruling that respondents had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their workplace and therefore had
no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the INS' entry.' 8 The
court further held that none of the respondents had been detained within
the meaning of the fourth amendment at any time during the factory
surveys.' 9
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision.20 Applying the standard enunciated by Justice Stewart
in his plurality opinion in United States v. Mendenhall,2 the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the entire workforce of the factory had been seized
12. Id. at 1760-61.
13. Id. at 1770 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 681 F.2d at 627. The forty-five work-
ers arrested at Mr. Pleat constituted approximately one half of that factory's workforce. Id.
15. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1761 n.1.
16. The two actions, filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, were later consolidated. Id. at 1761.




20. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.
1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 210 (1984). The court of appeals ruled that
the district court had not abused its discretion in denying class certification, but declined to
resolve the issue of whether the Union had standing to raise its members' fourth amendment
claims. Id. at 645 n.24.
21. "A person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if, in
Dee.1985]
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for the duration of the survey. The court reasoned that the agents sta-
tioned at the factory exits would cause a reasonable worker to believe
that he was not free to leave.22 The court further held that, under the
fourth amendment, an individual employee could be questioned only on
the basis of a reasonable suspicion that the individual was an illegal
alien.2 3 Because no such suspicion existed as to the individual respon-
dents, the court ruled that the agents' questioning of them violated their
fourth amendment rights.24
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
decision of the Ninth Circuit,25 noting that the lower court decision had
"serious ramifications for the enforcement of immigration laws."26 The
Court further explained its decision to grant certiorari by citing a con-
flicting opinion in the Third Circuit.
27
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures applies not only to full custodial arrests, but also to brief deten-
tions short of arrest.28 Where a seizure is custodial, an articulation of
probable cause for the arrest of the individual is required.29 Where, how-
ever, the detention does not rise to the level of a traditional arrest, the




The Supreme Court has identified two distinct types of sub-arrest
detentions which are relevant to its analysis in INS v. Delgado:3 the
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have be-
lieved that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
22. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 681 F.2d at 634.
23. d at 639-45.
24. Id. at 643.
25. 461 U.S. 904 (1983).
26. 104 S. Ct. at 1762.
27. The Court referred to Babula v. INS, 665 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1981), as presenting a
conflict with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Delgado. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1762.
28. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
29. A custodial seizure is one that is substantially similar to a full-blown arrest but does
not include formal charging. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
30. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979);
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31. Also relevant to the Court's analysis is its long-standing recognition that Congress has
plenary power to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens, see Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-
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investigative interrogation and the border stop. The investigative inter-
rogation 32 was first recognized by the Court in its examination of an in-
vestigatory "stop and frisk" in Terry v. Ohio.33 In that case a police
officer watched while Terry and another man suspiciously paced back
and forth in front of a store window and then joined up with a third man
a few blocks away. The officer approached the three men, identified him-
self as a policeman and asked them their names. When the officer re-
ceived an unsatisfactory response he grabbed Terry, searched his outer
clothing, and found a pistol inside his jacket pocket. After ordering the
men into a nearby store, the officer patted down the other two men and
found a second gun in one man's coat pocket. Only after this second
weapon had been found were the two men carrying guns arrested.34
At trial,35 the defense moved to suppress the guns as the fruit of an
illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion and the two
men were convicted.36 The Supreme Court affirmed, but noted that the
fourth amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures as well as to
full-blown searches and arrests.37 Holding that a seizure exists "when-
ever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away," the Court found that the officer had seized Terry when he
took hold of him and patted down his outer clothing.38 It further ex-
plained that the best test for determining the reasonableness of a particu-
lar search or seizure is to balance "the need to search or seize against the
invasion which the search or seizure entails.",39 To support an investiga-
tive seizure, the Court held that probable cause to arrest is not required.
However, some objective justification is necessary: "the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to-
gether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1974), and that-despite the breadth of this Congressional power-
it "cannot diminish the fourth amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken for aliens."
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
32. Although there are a number of investigative techniques which may be used in the
course of such a detention, the investigatory stop generally takes place on the street or in some
other public place, and most commonly involves both a request for identification and some
inquiry concerning the suspicious conduct of the person detained. See generally 3 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2 (1978).
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. Id. at 7.
35. Terry and Chilton, the man upon whom the second gun was found, were prosecuted
for carrying concealed weapons. Id.
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id. at 16.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523-37 (1967)).
Dee.1985]
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intrusion."'4
In Brown v. Texas,41 the Court applied the Terry rule to an officer's
demand for a citizen's identification. Two policemen observed Brown
walking away from another man in an alley in an area with a high inci-
dence of drug traffic. The officers stopped Brown and demanded that he
identify himself and explain what he was doing.42 When Brown refused
to answer, he was arrested for violating a Texas statute which made it a
criminal act for a citizen to refuse to give his name and address to an
officer "who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information."43
At trial, Brown unsuccessfully asserted that this statute violated the
first, fourth and fifth amendments and was unconstitutionally vague."
However, the Supreme Court reversed Brown's conviction, finding that
the officers had seized him when they detained him for the purpose of
requiring him to identify himself.4 5 The Court explained that the reason-
ableness of a seizure which is less intrusive than a traditional arrest de-
pends upon a balance between the public interest and the individual's
right to freedom from arbitrary interference by law officers. 4 6 Accord-
ingly, it held that an investigative interrogation must either be based on
specific, articulable suspicion or be performed according to some plan
which places neutral limitations on individual officers' conduct. 47
The Court distinguished Brown in United States v. Mendenhall.41 In
Mendenhall, the Court found that the defendant's fourth amendment
rights were not violated when two Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agents approached her in an airport concourse, asked her for
identification and requested that she accompany them to the airport
DEA office for further questioning. Once inside the office, Mendenhall
was asked if she would consent to a search of her person and handbag.49
40. Id. at 21.
41. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
42. Id at 49.
43. Id. "A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to report or gives a false
report of his name and residence address to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and
requested the information." TExAs PENAL CODE § 38.02 (Vernon 1974).
44. Brown, 443 U.S. at 49-50.
45. Id at 50.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 51 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-62 (1976)).
48. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
49. Id at 548, 555. The agents initially approached Mendenhall because her behavior
upon arriving at the airport fit their "drug courier profile," an informally compiled set of
characteristics considered by the DEA to be typical of persons carrying illegal drugs. Id. at
547 n.1. Their suspicions were enhanced when they noted that the name on her airline ticket
did not match that on her driver's license. Id. at 548.
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She replied, "Go ahead," and handed her purse to a DEA agent. Men-
denhall then accompanied a DEA agent into an adjoining room, where
she disrobed, removed a package of heroin from her undergarments and
handed the package to the agent.50
At her trial for possession of heroin, Mendenhall moved to suppress
the evidence obtained during the search. The trial court ruled that Men-
denhall had accompanied the agents to the DEA office voluntarily and
that her consent to the search in the office was freely and voluntarily
given. 51
In upholding the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court enunciated
the widely quoted rule that "a person has been 'seized' within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave." 2 The Court then listed various factors which
it felt might indicate a seizure even when the detained person did not
attempt to leave.5 3 Absent at least some of these factors, the Court
noted, an officer's otherwise inoffensive encounter with a citizen does not,
as a matter of law, implicate the fourth amendment."
The Mendenhall test was applied and defined in Florida v. Royer,5"
in a plurality opinion upon which the various members of the Delgado
Court placed substantial, albeit conflicting, emphasis. 6 Royer, like Men-
denhall, concerned an individual who was questioned in an airport con-
course by DEA agents.57 Like Ms. Mendenhall, Mr. Royer showed his
driver's license to the officers when they asked for identification, and then
produced an airline ticket bearing a name other than the one on the li-
cense. Unlike the DEA officers in Mendenhall, however, the agents who
questioned Royer failed to return his ticket or license, but abruptly
picked up Royer's luggage and asked him to accompany them to a small
room adjacent to the concourse. Royer did not respond verbally to the
50. Id. at 549.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 554.
53. The Court's list included "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of lan-
guage or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be com-
pelled." Id. (citations omitted). Because none of these factors was present and nothing else in
the record indicated that Mendenhall's cooperation with the DEA agents was not purely vol-
untary, the Court concluded that the evidence obtained during the search was properly admit-
ted at trial. Id at 555-59.
54. Id at 555.
55. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
56. See infra notes 143 & 183-91 and accompanying text.
57. Like Mendenhall, Royer fit the DEA's "drug courier profile." Royer, 460 U.S. at 493.
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agents' request that he consent to a search of his luggage, but he did
unlock one of the suitcases, which was found to contain marijuana.
When Royer said that he did not object to having the second suitcase
opened, the agents pried it open and discovered more marijuana.5 8
Royer was convicted of possession of marijuana after the trial court
denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of
the suitcases. 59 The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the con-
viction." The United States Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court's decision, ruling that Royer had been illegally detained when he
consented to the search of his luggage, and that the evidence found inside
the luggage, tainted by the illegality of the seizure, was therefore
inadmissible.61
The Court explained that "law enforcement officers do not violate
the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual" in a pub-
lic place, -asking him or her if he or she is willing to answer some ques-
tions or if he or she is willing to listen; nor would the fact that the officers
identify themselves as policemen, in itself, change the consensual nature
of the encounter.62 The Court noted, however, that an individual ap-
proached in this manner need not answer any of the questions put to
him, and may even decline to listen to the questions and continue on his
way.63 If police are to comply with the fourth amendment's protections,
the Court stated, the questioned individual "may not be detained even
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his
refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those
grounds.""
The Court further explained that although probable cause to arrest
is not required for every seizure of the person, the scope of any detention
not supported by probable cause must be "carefully tailored to its under-
lying justification."65 Thus an officer should detain an individual no
longer than is necessary to confirm or dispel his suspicions, and should
58. Royer claimed that he did not know the combination to unlock this second suitcase.
Id.
59. Id. at 495.
60. Florida v. Royer, 389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 460 U.S. 491
(1983).
61. Royer, 460 U.S. at 502-08.
62. Id. at 499 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 n.12 (1979); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 31-34 (1968); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980)).
63. Id. at 497-98 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1968)).
64. Id. at 498 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556 (1980)).
65. Id. at 500.
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use the least intrusive means possible to complete the investigation. 66
Based upon this reasoning, the Court found that although the of-
ficers' initial approach and questioning of Royer did not implicate the
fourth amendment,67 their subsequent detention of him did. As that de-
tention surpassed the limited scope necessary to effectuate the investiga-
tion for which the stop was made, the Court held that it violated Royer's
rights under the fourth amendment.
68
B. Border Stops
The second type of seizure short of traditional arrest relevant to the
Court's analysis in INS v. Delgado is the border stop, in which officers of
the Border Patrol stop a vehicle at or near an international border to
question the car's occupants about their citizenship and immigration sta-
tus. Such a stop, if made at a fixed checkpoint at the border itself, has
long been recognized by the Court to be a justifiable intrusion upon mo-
torists' privacy and liberty in the interest of national security.69 How-
ever, when the checkpoint is not fixed, but roving, or is removed from the
border or its functional equivalents, the intrusion upon the individual's
rights that inheres in the stop is not so easily justified. In such a case the
court must weigh the government interest against the degree of intrusion
in order to assess the constitutionality of that particular border stop.
70
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,71 the Court invalidated as un-
justifiably intrusive the search of an automobile approximately twenty-
five miles north of the Mexican border. Almeida-Sanchez, a Mexican
citizen holding a valid United States work permit, was stopped by Border
Patrol officers on an east-west highway in an undeveloped region of Cali-
fornia.72 The Border Patrol did not deny that it did not obtain a search
warrant, nor did it have probable cause of any kind to support this stop
73
66. Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975); Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
67. See id. at 523-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 501.
69. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
70. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
71. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The search in Almeida-Sanchez was conducted pursuant to
§ 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 233 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(3) (1982)), which provides for warrantless searches of automobiles "within a reason-
able distance from any external boundary of the United States," as authorized by the regula-
tions of the Attorney General. The Attorney General's regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1985),
defines a "reasonable distance" as "within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the
United States." Id.
72. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 267.
73. Id. at 268.
Dee.1985]
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or even the "reasonable suspicion" necessary for a "stop-and-frisk" de-
tention under Terry v. Ohio.74 On appeal from his conviction on drug
charges, Almeida-Sanchez challenged the constitutionality of the search,
which uncovered marijuana."
In finding that the stop violated Almeida-Sanchez's fourth amend-
ment rights, the Court emphasized the substantial distance between the
border and the point at which the stop was made. It remarked that
although routine border searches are permissible not only at the border
itself but also at its "fundamental equivalents," the search of Almeida-
Sanchez's car on a road more than twenty miles north of the border was
a search "of a wholly different sort."76 The search was, therefore, uncon-
stitutionally intrusive in the absence of probable cause or consent."
The ruling of Almeida-Sanchez was given a broader application in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,7  where a roving patrol stopped
Brignoni-Ponce's car on a north-south highway some distance north of
the Mexican border.79 The officers later explained that their only reason
for stopping this particular car was that its three occupants appeared to
be Mexicans. 0 Upon questioning Brignoni-Ponce and his two passen-
gers, the officers learned that the passengers were illegal aliens. At his
trial for transportation of illegal immigrants, Brignoni-Ponce moved to
suppress the testimony of and about the aliens, asserting that this evi-
dence was the fruit of an unlawful seizure."1 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether a roving patrol may stop a vehicle in an
area near-but not at-the border and question its occupants when the
only ground for suspicion is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican
ancestry.82
In upholding the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court ruled
that such a stop was prohibited by the fourth amendment. It explained
that to allow Border Patrol officials full discretion in stopping motorists
would contravene the reasonableness requirement of that amendment.
Even though the intrusion involved in a roving patrol stop is "modest,"
74. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
75. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 267. Almeida-Sanchez was convicted of having know-
ingly received, concealed and facilitated the transportation of a large quantity of imported
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1964).
76. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
77. Id. at 272-73.
78. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
79. Id. at 874-75. The stop took place on Interstate Highway 5 just north of San Cle-
mente, near a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint that was closed due to inclement weather. Id.
80. Id. at 875.
81. Id.
82. id at 876.
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the Court explained that a requirement of reasonable suspicion that a
particular vehicle is carrying illegal aliens is necessary to protect citizens
from "indiscriminate official interference." 3 In the absence of such sus-
picion, the Court held that a roving patrol stop in an area removed from
the border is not reasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. 4
The Court soon limited the reasonable suspicion requirement of
Brignoni-Ponce when it found, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,5 that
no similar suspicion was needed for a stop at a permanent checkpoint
located away from the border. Martinez-Fuerte involved various crimi-
nal prosecutions relating to the transportation of illegal aliens.86 Each of
the defendants was arrested at a fixed checkpoint operated by the Border
Patrol on a major interstate highway leading away from the border be-
tween California and Mexico.8 7 Each was first stopped and questioned at
the checkpoint and then directed to a secondary inspection area to pro-
duce citizenship documents. The Government conceded that none of the
stops at issue was based on any particular articulable suspicion.8 8 In all
three stops the occupants of the cars were arrested after questioning re-
vealed that at least some of the passengers were illegal aliens, and in one
case a search of the car subsequent to the questioning uncovered addi-
tional illegal aliens in the trunk. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the stops uncon-
stitutional.90 The Supreme Court reversed, arguing that a requirement of
reasonable suspicion to stop automobiles on major inland routes would
be impracticable given the heavy flow of traffic in such areas, and that the
intrusion upon fourth amendment interests caused by such stops was so
minimal as to be outweighed by the Government interest in facilitating
immigration law enforcement.91 The Court pointed to the diminished ex-
pectation of privacy a person has in his or her automobile as compared
with his or her residence,92 and emphasized that because the location of
the checkpoints was not chosen by the officers in the field, the risk of
83. Id. at 883.
84. Id.
85. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
86. Id. at 545. The trials of the three defendants were consolidated by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 549.
87. Id. at 545. This was the same fixed checkpoint that had been closed due to bad
weather in Brignoni-Ponce.
88. Id. at 547.
89. Id. at 547-48.
90. Id. at 549.
91. Id. at 556-59.
92. Id. at 561.
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arbitrary or harassing stops of individuals is much less than in the case of
roving patrols.9" Having concluded that the initial stops were constitu-
tional, the Court further held that it did not violate the fourth amend-
ment for the Border Patrol officers to refer motorists selectively to the
secondary inspection area on the basis of criteria that would not sustain a
roving patrol stop: "Even if it be assumed that such referrals are made
largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry,... the intrusion here
is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist to justify
it .... ,94
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
By way of preface to his majority opinion in INS v. Delgado, Justice
Rehnquist noted that the fourth amendment is not intended to proscribe
all contact between citizens and police, but only to prohibit "arbitrary
and oppressive interference" by police officers with individuals' privacy
and personal security.9 5 Because encounters between police and citizens
are so diverse, however, Justice Rehnquist felt that the Court had been
hesitant to define with precision the parameters of the fourth amend-
ment's proscriptions. Thus it had formulated only broad tests, like those
of Terry v. Ohio96 and United States v. Mendenhall,97 to determine
whether a seizure has occurred. The Terry test, Justice Rehnquist com-
mented, is useful in situations resembling traditional arrest, but is too
difficult to apply in cases involving only brief detentions. 98 For this rea-
son, the Mendenhall "totality of the circumstances" test would be ap-
plied in Delgado.99
Justice Rehnquist went on to note that the court of appeals placed
its primary emphasis upon the fact that agents were stationed at the fac-
tory doors when it concluded that the surveys in this case constituted a
seizure of the entire workforce." In the lower court's view, the agents'
presence at the doors indicated that "departures [by the workers] were
93. Id. at 559.
94. Id. at 563.
95. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (1984) (quoting United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)).
96. 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (holding that seizure occurs "only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has restrained the liberty of a citizen").
97. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
98. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1762.
99. Id. at 1763.
100. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 634 (9th Cir.
1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
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not to be contemplated," and that the workers were "not free to
leave." 101
Justice Rehnquist rejected the respondents' claim that the entire
workforces of the two factories were seized when the agents were sta-
tioned at the exits."02 He asserted that the workers' freedom of move-
ment about the factory was restricted only by their "voluntary
obligations to their employers," and not by the conduct of the INS
agents. 103 Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the workers continued to go
about their business in the factory despite the disruptions caused by the
presence of the agents."°
The majority opinion also rejected the notion that the agents posi-
tioned at the factory doors actually prevented workers from leaving the
premises. 0 5 Justice Rehnquist asserted that the INS' intent in guarding
the exits was not to prevent egress, but only "to insure that all persons in
the factories were questioned."10 6 Justice Rehnquist thus concluded that
the respondents had no reason to fear that they would be detained so
long as they gave truthful answers or simply refused to answer the ques-
tions put to them. 107 If merely questioning the workers while they were
inside the factory did not implicate the fourth amendment, then neither
did questioning them at the exits. Thus, Justice Rehnquist concluded, no
citizen or alien lawfully present inside the factory had reason to fear that
he would be detained by the INS agents. 08
Justice Rehnquist next considered the court of appeals' holding that
the "detentive questioning" of individual workers was valid under the
fourth amendment only if the INS agents had reasonable grounds to sus-
pect that the individual being questioned was an illegal alien. 09 Because
the Court had rejected the lower court's holding that the INS' method of
101. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1763.
102. Id. Justice Rehnquist further rejected the assertion that the fact that the surveys took
place in factories, closed to the public, was indicative of seizure. He explained that because the
INS agents were lawfully in the factories pursuant to a warrant or with the owner's consent,
and because there were other people around when each worker was questioned, the same con-
siderations applicable to public encounters between citizens and police should apply here. Id
at 1763 n.5.
103. Id. at 1763.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The Court dismissed as "[ain ambiguous, isolated incident" the report of one of
the respondents that an agent stationed at an exit had attempted to prevent a worker, presuma-
bly an illegal alien, from leaving the premises. The worker walked out the door, and when the
agent tried to stop him he pushed the agent aside and ran away. Id. at 1764 n.6.
107. Id. at 1764.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 681 F.2d at 638).
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conducting factory surveys had resulted in a seizure of the entire
workforces, Justice Rehnquist explained that the issue of whether ques-
tioning individual workers implicated the fourth amendment could be
presented only if one of the named respondents were found to have been
seized or detained.110 Emphasizing that the respondents' own deposition
testimony showed that the questioning was quite brief, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that no individual seizure occurred.'
The respondents had argued that the surveys so disrupted their
workplace as to create a psychological environment in which they were
reasonably afraid that they were not free to leave. The respondents rea-
soned that the agents' questioning constituted a seizure under the fourth
amendment because they reasonably feared that they must answer to
avoid arrest. The Court rejected this argument, however, asserting that
because the INS' "obvious" intent was merely to question people, those
workers who continued with their business were not detained at all,
but-at most-were simply asked a question or two. The Court pointed
out that although those workers who attempted to escape the agents'
questioning might have been seized, the respondents did not do so, and
therefore were not detained." 2 In sum, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The manner in which respondents were questioned, given its
obvious purpose, could hardly result in a reasonable fear that
respondents were not free to continue working or to move
about the factory. Respondents may only litigate what hap-
pened to them, and our review of their description of the en-
counters with the INS agents satisfies us that the encounters




Justice Stevens concurred in INS v. Delgado, noting that because no
110. Id.
111. Id. Respondent Delgado had been speaking with a co-worker regarding the survey
when two INS agents approached him to ask where he was from. When Delgado replied that
he was from Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, one agent made "an innocuous observation" to the other,
and then the two agents walked away. Id. Similarly, respondent Correa was questioned and
then left alone after she gave an acceptable reply. Id. An agent tapped respondent Labonte on
the shoulder and asked her, in Spanish, "Where are your papers?" Labonte responded that she
had her papers and showed them to the agents, who then left. Id. The fourth respondent,
Miramontes, was approached by an agent while en route to her worksite from another office.
Questioned about her citizenship, Miramontes informed the agent that she was a legal resident
alien. She then produced her work permit at the agent's request. Id. at 1764-65.
112. Id. at 1765.
113. Id.
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trial had ever been held in the case, the Court was bound to review the
record in the light most favorable to the INS, and to resolve all issues of
fact in its favor." 4 Because he agreed that the respondents were not
entitled to summary judgment, Justice Stevens joined the opinion of the
Court.
1 1 5
Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion concurring in the result.'
16
Although the question of whether any of the respondents had been seized
within the meaning of the fourth amendment was "a close one," Justice
Powell argued that the Court need not have decided it, for-under the
reasoning of United States v. Martinez-Fuertel--such a seizure would
have been reasonable.11 In that case the Court weighed the public inter-
est in the INS surveys, which it found to be high, against the interference
with the fourth amendment rights of the individual, which it considered
to be minimal.1 9 Thus the Court ruled that the stops made at the check-
points did not violate the fourth amendment, even in the absence of any
articulable suspicion that a particular automobile was carrying illegal
aliens. 120
Justice Powell found Martinez-Fuerte to be analogous to the case at
hand. 21  Citing statistics presented in an affidavit by an INS official,1
21
Justice Powell declared that the government's interest in conducting fac-
tory surveys was at least as great as its interest in carrying out automo-
bile stops at fixed checkpoints.12 3 Given that many immigrants come to
114. 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 1765 (Stevens, J., concurring).
116. 104 S. Ct. at 1765 (Powell, ., concurring in result).
117. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
118. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1765 (Powell, J., concurring in result).
119. Id. at 1766 (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555). Justice Powell explained that the
Martinez-Fuerte Court had noted the substantial government interest in maintaining routine
checkpoint stops in order to control the flow of illegal aliens into the nation's interior. On the
other side of the equation, the Court found that the intrusion upon individual drivers was
limited due to the brevity of the stops and the "public and regularized" character of the stop-
ping procedure. Id. (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562).
120. Id. at 1766 (Powell, J., concurring in result) (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562).
121. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in result).
122. The INS' assistant district director in Los Angeles had stated that factory surveys
accounted for 50-75% of the daily arrests and identifications of illegal aliens in the Los Ange-
les district, that over 20,000 illegal aliens were arrested in that district in one year and that the
surveys in the instant case had led to the arrest of between 20% and 50% of the workforce at
each of the factories. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in result). This last figure broke down to 78
arrests out of 300 workers at the first survey at Davis Pleating Co., followed by 39 arrests out
of 200 workers at the second raid of that factory. The third survey, at Mr. Pleat, resulted in
the arrest of 45 illegal aliens from a workforce of approximately 90 employees. Id. at 1766 n.3
(Powell, 3., concurring in result).
123. Id. at 1766 (Powell, J., concurring in result).
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this country in the hope of finding employment, Justice Powell reasoned
that to focus immigration law enforcement on the aliens' workplace is to
strike directly at the cause of the immigration problem.' 24 Justice Powell
concluded that the government interest in the continued use of this en-
forcement technique is substantial, while the intrusion upon the individ-
ual workers-who are questioned only briefly and may continue their
work as the survey progresses-is even more minimal than that felt by
the motorists in Martinez-Fuerte.1
25
Justice Powell went on to discount the element of surprise inherent
in the factory survey procedure, arguing that "the obviously authorized
character of the operation, the clear purpose of seeking illegal aliens, and
the systematic and public nature of the survey serve to minimize any
concern or fright on the part of lawful employees."' 26 He further as-
serted that the workers' expectation of privacy in their workplace, like a
motorist's expectation of privacy in his automobile, is significantly less
than the expectation of privacy one feels in one's residence. 127 Thus, as
the Court found the checkpoint stops in Martinez-Fuerte to be reasonable
without any particularized suspicion, Justice Powell upheld the factory
surveys in Delgado on the same grounds.
128
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, dissented in
part and concurred in part. 129 Justice Brennan broke down the major-
ity's holding into two prongs. The Court first held that the surveys did
not constitute seizure of the entire workforce for the duration of the op-
eration. The Court further held that the questioning of the individual
respondents did not amount to seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. 130 Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's first decision,
finding'that there was no single continuing seizure of the workforce.
13 1
124. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in result).
125. Id. at 1766-67 (Powell, J., concurring in result).
126. Id. at 1767 (Powell, J., concurring in result).
127. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in result).
128. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in result). Powell further analogized the Border Patrol
agents' selection of motorists to be sent to the secondary inspection site to the INS agents'
selection of individual workers to be interrogated. He rejected the dissent's argument that the
INS agents had greater discretion than did the officers of the Border Patrol, asserting that the
selection procedure upheld in Martinez-Fuerte afforded Border Patrol officers "virtually unlim-
ited discretion to refer cars to the secondary inspection area." Id. at 1767 n.6 (Powell, J.,
concurring in result).
129. 104 S. Ct. at 1767 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
130. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
131. Justice Brennan felt that the fact that most of the workers were free to continue work-
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He disagreed with the second decision, however, declaring that a correct
application of precedent to the facts of this case showed that the respon-
dents had been unreasonably seized during the factory surveys.1 32 For
that reason, Justice Brennan characterized the majority opinion as hav-
ing a "studied air of unreality.1 33 He felt that the majority's manipula-
tion of the facts and precedent to reach its desired conclusion constituted
"6a considerable feat of legerdemain," 134 and that although the Court had
found the interrogations of the individual respondents to be consensual
encounters, the record told a "far different story."'
135
Justice Brennan traced the line of the Court's previous inquiries into
the circumstances under which a police officer's questioning of an indi-
vidual may constitute fourth amendment seizure, 136 and cited Justice
Stewart's plurality opinion in United States v. Mendenhall 137 as provid-
ing a useful summary of the preceding cases. Justice Brennan noted both
Justice Stewart's comment that the fourth amendment is not implicated
"'as long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disre-
ing and to move about the workplace while the survey was being conducted supported the
conclusion that no seizure of the workforce had occurred. He did, however, stress that he
found the evidence regarding conditions throughout the factory during the course of the sur-
vey to be relevant in determining whether the individual respondents had been seized. Id. at
1767 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 1767 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
133. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
134. Id. at 1767-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
135. Id. at 1768 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
136. Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's suggestion that the Court had not yet
decided the issue of whether "mere questioning" of an individual by police could constitute a
seizure. He conceded that "the question does not admit of any simple answer," but cited a
long line of cases in which the issue had indeed been addressed. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part). Justice Brennan further explained that it is difficult for the Court to strike a uniform
balance between the confficting interests of personal freedom and police effectiveness, but that
nevertheless "the outline of what appears to be the appropriate inquiry has been traced over
the years with some clarity." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). He then went on to cite
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Court held that "'whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person,'" and
noted that such a seizure may occur when the officer uses either physical force or a show of
authority to restrain the individual's liberty. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1768 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing in part) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 19 n.16). Justice Brennan further quoted Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), which confirmed that detentions for purposes of questioning
implicated the fourth amendment and which also noted that although police are free to ques-
tion citizens regarding unsolved crimes, citizens are equally free to refuse to answer. Delgado,
104 S. Ct. at 1768 (quoting Davis, 394 U.S. at 727 n.6). Justice Brennan then cited the holding
in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), which invalidated the defendant's conviction for refus-
ing to identify himself to police where the officers could point to no objective facts supporting a
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in any criminal activity. Delgado, 104 S.
Ct. at 1768 (citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 51).
137. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
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gard the questions and walk away,' ,,138 and his statement that "'a per-
son has been "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment only
if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' "139 Justice
Brennan further quoted Justice Stewart's listing of circumstances which
might produce such a reasonable belief.1°
Justice Brennan noted that the Mendenhall formula, adopted by the
majority in Florida v. Royer,1"' focused on the objective characteristics of
the individual's encounter with the police rather than upon "the subjec-
tive impressions of the person questioned."14 Furthermore, Justice
Brennan explained, the Royer opinion provided useful guidance to the
Court in deciding Delgado when it declared that although the fourth
amendment is not violated when officers merely put questions to individ-
uals on the street or in a public place, the person being questioned "may
not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds
for doing so, and his refusal to listen or to answer does not, without
more, furnish those grounds."
' 143
Applying the standards of Royer and Mendenhall to the instant
case, Justice Brennan determined that the respondents indeed had been
seized for purposes of the fourth amendment when the INS agents ques-
tioned them regarding their citizenship. 1" He reasoned that the surveys
involved such a "show of authority" on the part of the INS that "a rea-
sonable person could not help but feel compelled to stop and provide
answers to the INS agents' questions." 145 Justice Brennan took issue
with the majority's insistence on considering the questioning of each of
the respondents in isolation and ignoring the disruption going on in the
factory around them. 146 He pointed to the respondents' extensive testi-
mony regarding the "widespread disturbance" that the survey provoked
138. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1769 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 554).
139. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
140. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). See supra
note 53 and accompanying text.
141. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
142. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1769 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Nor does the Mendenhall
analysis look to the subjective intent of the interrogating officer. The majority opinion in Del-
gado thus misapplied Mendenhall when it focused on the INS' "intent" and "obvious purpose"
in placing agents at the factory doors. See supra note 251 and accompanying text; see also
Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1763-64.
143. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1769 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Royer, 460 U.S.
at 497).
144. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
145. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
146. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
Dec.1985] INS v. DELGADO
among the workers and the "intimidating atmosphere" that the INS' in-
vestigating techniques created. 47 Taken together, Justice Brennan rea-
soned, these factors created an environment in which a reasonable person
would feel that he had no choice but to answer any questions put to
him. 148
Justice Brennan further pointed to the respondents' testimony about
their own individual experiences, which indicated that they did not feel
free to ignore the agents' questioning.14 9 He concluded from this testi-
mony that the respondents had plainly felt that they had no choice but to
answer the questions put to them by the INS agents. 150 Considering this
feeling to be patently reasonable, Justice Brennan characterized the scene
depicted by the respondents' testimony as "a frightening picture of peo-
ple subjected to wholesale interrogation under conditions designed not to
respect personal security and privacy, but rather to elicit prompt answers
from completely intimidated workers."' 1 Justice Brennan thus deter-
mined that the INS agents' questioning of the individual respondents
clearly constituted seizure for purposes of the fourth amendment. 152
Having found that the fourth amendment was implicated, Justice
147. Specifically, Justice Brennan cited the large numbers of INS agents who were em-
ployed in each of the surveys, the agents' practice of handcuffing those persons whom they
suspected of being illegal aliens and leading them away to vans parked outside the factory, the
conspicuous positioning of guards at buildings' exits, and the manner in which the agents
flashed their badges and asked brusque, pointed questions of each of the workers. Id. at 1770
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (citing Appellant's Brief at 48, 77-78, 81-85, 88, 102-03, 122-
23, 125-26, 140-41, 144-55, 158).
148. Justice Brennan felt that it was "simply fantastic" that the majority could view these
circumstances and still conclude that a reasonable person observing all of this would believe
that he was free to refuse to answer the agents' questions and walk away. Id. at 1770 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting in part).
149. For example, Respondent Delgado was told after initial questioning that the agents
"would be coming back to check him out again because he spoke English too well." Justice
Brennan characterized this remark as "a final reminder of who controlled the situation." Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Respondent Miramontes testified that she produced her work
permit for an agent only after he identified himself as being from the INS and showed her his
badge. Miramontes was quoted as saying, "'He told me he was from Immigration, so I
showed him the [work permit] papers when I saw his badge. If I hadn't [seen his badge), I
wouldn't have shown them to him.'" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Appellant's
Brief at 121) (additions in original). Respondent Labontes was seated at her machine when an
agent approached her from behind, tapped her on the shoulder, and asked for her papers.
Although she did not wish to identify herself, Labontes testified, she did so when she saw the
INS agents. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (citing Appellant's Brief at 138).
150. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
151. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
152. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Brennan noted that because the respon-
dents had not contended that the interrogation sessions were "custodial" in nature, he need
not consider whether the agents' questioning of the respondents violated their fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination, nor whether the agents had a duty under Miranda v. Arizona,
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Brennan addressed the issue of whether the seizures in this case were
justified on the basis of reasonable, objective criteria. 53 He emphasized
that the requirement of particularized suspicion to justify even a brief
detention was necessary to protect citizens against "unwarranted govern-
mental interference with their personal security and privacy."'
' 54
Justice Brennan determined that, in the instant case, the seizures of
the individual workers were neither justified by reasonable suspicion nor
carried out in such a way as to place neutral limitations on the officers'
conduct so that unreasonable government interference might be mini-
mized.' 55 Instead, the INS agents interrogated nearly every worker in
each factory surveyed, irrespective of whether they were United States
citizens, lawful resident aliens or deportable illegal aliens.' 6 In Justice
Brennan's view, the only arguably objective criteria used by the agents in
determining whether or not to interrogate a particular worker were
whether he or she had a Latin appearance or spoke Spanish in the work-
place.157 Thus, he argued that those workers who were not illegal
aliens-a "clear majority" at each of the surveyed factories-were sub-
jected to the intrusion of questioning by INS agents who had no objec-
tively reasonable basis for suspecting them of any misconduct. 8
Moreover, Justice Brennan argued, even if the INS agents had ques-
tioned only those workers whom they reasonably suspected of being
aliens, they still would have violated the fourth amendment rights of the
United States citizens questioned in this case. Because it is virtually im-
possible to accurately distinguish between United States citizens of Mexi-
can ancestry and Mexican aliens, Justice Brennan explained that such a
policy would not, in practice, prevent the questioning of citizens who
appear to be of Mexican heritage.' 59 Therefore, in order to protect the
rights of both citizens and lawful resident aliens, who are also protected
384 U.S. 436 (1966), to warn the respondents that their answers might be used against them.
Id. at 1770-71 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
153. Id. at 1771 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Brennan cited United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981), for the proposition that investigatory stops, even those fall-
ing short of traditional arrest, "must be justified by some objective manifestation that the per-
son stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." Id.
154. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1771 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
155. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
156. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
157. Id. at 1771-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).'
158. In Justice Brennan's opinion, "[t]o say that such an indiscriminate policy of mass in-
terrogation is constitutional makes a mockery of the word of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
1772 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
159. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 886 (1975)).
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by the fourth amendment,16 ° Brennan concluded that the INS should be
required to limit its interrogations to those workers who are reasonably
suspected of being illegal aliens.
1 61
Justice Brennan objected to Justice Powell's assertion that the ques-
tioning of the respondents constituted a seizure that was reasonable
under the balancing test of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.162 He noted
the Court's recognition1 61 that the "crucial distinction" between the rov-
ing patrols invalidated in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and the fixed
checkpoint stops upheld in Martinez-Fuerte was the "lesser intrusion
upon the motorist's Fourth Amendment interests" caused by the check-
point stops. 164 Given this distinction, Justice Brennan reasoned that Jus-
tice Powell's reliance upon Martinez-Fuerte in support of his position was
misplaced, as the factors which contributed to the greater intrusion of the
roving stops-the element of surprise and the extensive discretion vested
in the investigating officers-were equally present in the factory
surveys.1 6 - Thus the rationale fashioned by the Martinez-Fuerte Court in
support of its validation of the fixed checkpoint stops was, in Justice
Brennan's opinion, inapposite to the case at hand. 
66
Justice Brennan concluded that the INS could not continue to con-
duct its factory surveys without violating workers' fourth amendment
rights unless it either adopted a policy of interrogating only those work-
ers reasonably suspected of being illegal aliens or established a factory
survey procedure that is "predictably and reliably less intrusive" than
that used in the surveys at issue in the instant case.' 67 The first alterna-
tive, he explained, would provide for the particularized suspicion re-
quired under Terry v. Ohio, while the second would make the survey
procedure more closely analogous to the program upheld in Martinez-
Fuerte. This second alternative might, as Justice Brennan envisioned it,
160. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266, 273 (1973)).
161. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 1773 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
163. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
164. Id. at 656.
165. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1774 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Brennan further
explained that although a motorist's expectation of privacy in his automobile on the open
highway is limited, the expectation of privacy a worker feels in his workplace, though modest,
is a "legitimate" interest which "cannot be indiscriminately invaded by government agents."
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (citing Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1968)).
Moreover, the employer's having consented to the INS' entry into the factory "does not mean
that the workers' expectation of privacy [in their workplace] evaporates." Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting in part).
166. Id. at 1774 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
167. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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require a warrant based upon a showing of reasonable suspicion that the
factory to be surveyed employed a certain number of illegal aliens subject
to deportation. Additionally, Justice Brennan urged, the surveys should
be made shorter and less disruptive so as to reduce the intrusion they
caused upon the workers. 16
Finally, Justice Brennan asserted that the majority had become "so
mesmerized by the magnitude" of the nation's illegal alien problem that
it "too easily allowed Fourth Amendment freedoms to be sacrificed." 16 9
He criticized the Court for having granted "virtually unconstrained dis-
cretion" to the INS and for having willingly placed all of the burdens of
this faulty law enforcement scheme upon Mexican-American citizens
and lawful resident aliens, while remaining unwilling to penalize the em-
ployers whose policies of hiring illegal aliens provide a powerful incentive
for aliens to enter this country in the first place.170 The solution to the
immigration problem, Brennan warned, was not to be found in the sacri-
fice of constitutional freedoms, but only in a legislative reevaluation of
immigration law and policy.171
V. ANALYSIS
The majority opinion in INS v. Delgado was clearly a result-oriented
decision. In order to reach its desired conclusion, the majority was
forced to ignore certain threshold issues, to misrepresent the factual rec-
ord and to misapply the relevant legal precedent. Whether this conclu-
sionary treatment derived from any xenophobic or racist tendencies on
the part of the individual Justices or merely from a pragmatic desire to
extend immigration officers' powers to enforce the law, it resulted in a
fundamentally defective and unsatisfying analysis.
A. Threshold Issues
The Delgado record gave rise to three issues which should properly
have been addressed at the outset of the Court's analysis. However, far
from giving these issues-(1) the constitutional validity of the warrants
pursuant to which the raids were conducted,17 2 (2) the possible equal
protection violations arising from the singling out of Mexican-American
citizens T17 and (3) the validity of the factory owner's consent in lieu of a
168. Id. at 1774-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part):
169. Id. at 1775 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
170. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
171. Id. at 1776 (Brennan, ., dissenting in part).
172. See infra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
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warrant"' 4-- the primary consideration they deserved, the majority Jus-
tices chose to ignore them completely. The Justices may have felt that
these issues were improperly raised at trial or on appeal, or that their
disposition of the other issues in the case was such that they need not
reach these threshold questions. 175 If so, a footnote to that effect would
have sufficed to explain the Court's failure to resolve these initial issues.
In the absence of such an explanation, however, the lack of any resolu-
tion of these preliminary inquiries seems strikingly improper.
1. Validity of the search warrants
Two of the three raids at issue in Delgado were conducted pursuant
to warrants authorizing a search for persons. The warrants did not list
any suspected illegal aliens by name, but were worded as if the agents
were seeking not persons but personal property: "[T]here is now being
concealed certain property, namely persons, namely illegal persons
which are the fruits and instrumentalities and evidence of violations of
Title 8, United States Code, Sections 1324 and 1325 .... ,,76 In essence,
each warrant purported to authorize entry into the factory to look for
illegal aliens, who were in essence the "fruits and instrumentalities" of
their own illegal presence.
1 77
That these warrants failed to name any particular suspected illegal
alien indicates that they were not criminal search warrants, but were in-
stead "hybrid" warrants of the type authorized by the District of Colum-
174. See infra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
175. Although Justice Brennan, dissenting in Delgado, did question the effect of the em-
ployer's consent upon the workers' expectations of privacy, see supra note 165, neither Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed the consent issue in any
significant way. The circuit court, however, explained its failure to dispose of this question by
noting that it need not reach this issue because it had determined that the raids as conducted
violated the workers' fourth amendment rights. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 629 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct.
1758 (1984). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
176. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d at 624, 627 n.5
(9th Cir. 1982). While 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1984) makes bringing in or harboring illegal aliens
unlawful, § 1325 provides that aliens who enter the United States without authorization or
who obtain entry by concealing information about themselves are subject to criminal prosecu-
tion. It should be noted that employers of illegal aliens are rarely prosecuted under § 1324, as
under federal law hiring illegal aliens does not constitute harboring them and is neither a civil
nor a criminal offense. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4) (1970 & Supp. 1983). See also Note, Individ-
ualized Suspicion in Factory Searches-The "Least Intrusive Alternative," International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982), 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 403,
405 n.1 (1983-84).
177. See Note, The Factory Raid: An Unconstitutional Act?, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 620
(1982-83).
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bia Circuit in Blackie's House of Beef Inc. v. Castillo.178 A hybrid
warrant is something of a cross between a criminal search warrant,
which must be supported by substantial probable cause and particular-
ity, 17 9 and a routine inspection warrant, which requires a significantly
lower standard of probable cause.18 The hybrid warrant standard al-
lows the INS to procure a warrant to inspect commercial premises for
undocumented aliens without specifying by name or description the par-
ticular persons sought, so long as some specific and reliable suspicion is
shown "to prevent the exercise of unbridled discretion" by INS
officers. 18 1
The Sppreme Court has not addressed the constitutional validity of
the hybrid warrant. 82 However, the Supreme Court opinions upon
which the District of Columbia Circuit relied most heavily in formulat-
ing its hybrid standard in Blackie's do not truly support application of
such a standard to INS procedures. In Camara v. Municipal Court,
18 3
the Court recognized a lower standard of probable cause for warrants for
routine inspections of residential premises by officials seeking to enforce
health and safety codes. This lower standard was justified despite the
fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable government intru-
178. 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982) (establishing hybrid
warrant standard for INS raids of commercial businesses). The new hybrid standard allows a
warrant to be issued on a showing of "sufficient specificity and reliability to prevent the exer-
cise of unbridled discretion by law enforcement officials." Id. at 1225. The warrant need not
name or describe the individuals to be sought. Id. This hybrid standard was presumably
applied by the INS nationwide when, two months after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Blackie's House of Beef, INS agents apprehended thousands of suspected illegal aliens in a
sweep ofjob sites across the country. Note, Fourth Amendment Warrant Standardsfor Immi-
gration Search of Business Premises for Undocumented Aliens: A New Hybrid Probable Cause?,
13 RUTGERS L.J. 607, 607 n.1 (1982) (citing N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1982, at A14, col. 1).
179. The level of probable cause traditionally required for a criminal warrant is suspicion
such that a reasonable person can believe that "the legitimate object of a search is located in a
particular place." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981).
180. Probable cause for a routine inspection warrant exists when "reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a par-
ticular dwelling." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
181. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1225. See supra note 178.
182. The Court declined to review the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Blackie's
House of Beef, 455 U.S. 940 (1982), and, as noted above, failed to address the warrant issue in
its consideration of Delgado. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, however, has
squarely rejected the use of hybrid warrants in INS raids. In a decision issued on October 11,
1985, Judge Robert Aguilar of San Jose ruled that INS agents may not enter a factory or other
workplace without employer consent except with a warrant naming specific suspected illegal
aliens. Judge Aguilar further ruled that agents may not add the phrase "and others" to spe-
cific names. See L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § II, at 6, col. 1.
183. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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sions, the Court explained, because the strong state interest in conducting
area inspections to ensure compliance with these codes outweighs the
invasion which such a search entails. 1 4 The Court based its decision on
three factors: (1) the historical acceptance of such inspections by the
courts and the public; (2) the lack of any acceptable and practical alter-
natives; and (3) the fact that the inspections aim at premises, not at peo-
ple, and are noncriminal in nature.18 5  These factors minimize the
inspections' intrusiveness, the Court held, so that probable cause to be-
lieve that a particular building contains a housing code violation need not
be shown. Instead, probable cause may be found and a warrant to in-
spect may be issued "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling."
' 186
Although the court in Blackie's interpreted Camara and its progeny
as supporting an application of the hybrid warrant standard to adminis-
trative searches in general, those cases in fact dealt with inspections of a
distinct and distinguishable type. The factors emphasized by the Camara
court to support its formulation of the lower standard are unique to rou-
tine inspections to enforce compliance with health and safety codes, and
are simply not present in immigration searches of business premises.
First, the surprise INS raids have no history of judicial and popular ac-
ceptance to parallel that of Camara-type inspections; indeed, factory
sweeps were discontinued by executive order in 1980 and were reinsti-
tuted only after the administration changed one year later. 187 Moreover,
as the Ninth Executive Circuit held in Delgado, procedures far less intru-
sive than those currently employed by the INS may be used to serve the
same law enforcement objectives.18 Finally, both the surprise nature of
the INS raids and their focus on people rather than property render them
far more intrusive than the inspections of premises at issue in Camara.
18 9
184. Id. at 533-37.
185. Id. at 537.
186. Id. at 538.
187. President Carter ordered the sweep procedures stopped to ensure that aliens would
cooperate in the 1980 census, but President Reagan reinstated the sweeps when he took office
in 1981. See Low, Justices to Decide Legality of Sweeps for Aliens on Jobs, L.A. Daily J., Apr.
26, 1983, at 1, col. 2; id., Apr. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
188. The circuit court held that the INS raids could and must be conducted according to
restrictive neutral limitations, e.g., in accordance with a plan requiring reasonable suspicion
that each individual questioned is an illegal alien. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 640-44 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S.
Ct. 1758 (1984). See Note, supra note 176, at 416-17.
189. See supral notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
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Given these differences, the Blackie's court's extension of the Camara
hybrid warrant standard to INS searches seems questionable.
Even if the hybrid standard were properly extended to INS proce-
dures, it is clear that such a warrant alone could not authorize the search
or seizure of any persons found on the premises. An administrative war-
rant only authorizes entry to the premises described in the warrant. 190
Once the agents executing the warrant are inside the premises, their con-
tact with persons found there must be considered warrantless.19" ' Any
determination of the reasonableness of that contact must take that war-
rantlessness into account. Although the fourth amendment does not spe-
cifically prohibit searches conducted without a warrant, such searches
are generally presumed to be unreasonable. 192 Further, while section
287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 193 purports to provide
the INS with authority to interrogate without a warrant any alien con-
cerning his right to remain in the United States, that statutory authority
is clearly limited by the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amend-
ment. 194 Thus the constitutionality of the use of hybrid warrants in the
Delgado case should have been addressed as a threshold issue in the
Court's analysis.
2. Equal protection considerations
A further concern conspicuously ignored by the Delgado majority is
the potential for violations of equal protection inherent in the procedures
by which INS agents obtain and execute hybrid warrants. First, the affi-
davits upon which the warrants are based often state only racial stereo-
types or "alien profiles" rather than specific descriptions of particular
suspected individuals. 195 Thus, not only illegal aliens, but also citizens
190. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1982). See
Note, supra note 177, at 623.
191. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 629 n.8 (9th
Cir. 1982), rev'dsub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984). See Comment, INSSurveys
of Business Establishments" Reasonable, Individualized Suspicion of Illegal Alienage, 78 Nw.
U.L. REv. 632, 641 (1983).
192. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29.
193. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Any officer or employee of the Service... shall have the power without warrant-
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to
remain in the United States; (2) to arrest any alien.., if he has reason to believe that
the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation
and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.
194. See Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on Nonborder Searches for Illegal Aliens
The Immigration and Naturalization Service Meets the Constitution, 39 OHio ST. L.J. 66, 74
(1978).
195. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 627 n.5 (9th
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and lawful aliens whose Hispanic heritage is evident in their dress and
physical appearance, are targeted by the warrants and by the agents who
use them.
Further, because the warrants need not name specific suspected
aliens nor even describe them, agents are given broad discretion in deter-
mining which workers to interrogate once they have entered the prem-
ises. At this level, too, individuals are singled out on the basis of their
Hispanic appearance, 9 6 so that the rights of Mexican-American citizens
may be imperiled. The equal protection considerations attending this
outcome have been noted by the District Court for the Southern District
of New York, which found
[s]trong public interest in the protection of citizens from cam-
paigns by law enforcement officials.., especially so in view of
the dominant role which physical or racial appearance inevita-
bly plays in the officer's decision to stop and inquire, a factor
which adds significant Fourteenth Amendment overtones to
what is essentially a Fourth Amendment problem.
1 97
Even where no warrant has been obtained or executed, however, as
with the raid in Delgado conducted pursuant to the factory owner's con-
sent, INS procedures raise equal protection concerns. Although the INS'
statutory authority to perform warrantless arrests and interrogations 198
seems racially neutral on its face, studies suggest that the statute unfairly
burdens Mexican-Americans in its administration. 9 9 Such a result can
only be expected from the statute's broad grant of discretion to INS
Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984) (affidavit of INS investigator
stated that affiant had observed "twenty persons of apparent Latin decent [sic]" entering the
factory premises).
196. The Ninth Circuit noted a list of factors considered by INS agents to indicate illegal
alienage: "the person's clothing, facial appearance, hair coloring and styling, demeanor (i.e.
anxiety or fright), language and accent, and a multitude of subjective. . . 'multisensory' fac-
tors." Id. at 627 n.6. On the witness stand in another action challenging the constitutionality
of INS factory sweeps, an INS criminal investigator stated that agents looked for a number of
visible characteristics, including: unstylish haircuts on men, old-fashioned haircuts on women,
lack of eyeglasses, old dress shoes instead of work shoes, lack of jewelry, odor, short height and
politeness. Illegal aliens "don't wear designer jeans," the investigator said. Martinez v.
Nygaard, No. 84-380 (D. Ore.) (tried December, 1984) (to be decided in Spring, 1985) (Testi-
mony of INS agent Kent Nygaard), quoted in Girdner, Oregon Case Tests INS Authority in
Mass Detentions, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 25, 1984, at 20, col. 5.
197. Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (disapproving use of racial
profiles in INS street operations).
198. See supra note 193.
199. In "Project Jobs," a recent crackdown on illegal aliens nationwide, more than 80% of
the arrestees were Mexicans. By contrast, most estimates of illegal aliens in the country indi-
cate that only 50% are of Mexican heritage. See Note, supra note 177, at 641 n.214.
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agents, who, by their own admission,2" look almost exclusively to racial
characteristics in determining which individuals should be questioned.
Of course, this racially disproportionate impact does not, in itself, render
a facially neutral statute unconstitutional,2"1 but it does raise equal pro-
tection questions which the Delgado Court should have addressed, if not
resolved.2o2
3. Validity of entry by owner's consent
Perhaps the most striking of the three threshold issues ignored by
the Delgado Court is the constitutional validity of the INS' entry into one
of the factories without a warrant but with the factory owner's consent.
By its silence on this issue, the Court treated consent as if it were essen-
tially equivalent to the warrants used in the other two raids. As has been
explained, these warrants authorized entry to the factory premises to
search not for objects, but for the persons of the unnamed suspected ille-
gal alins.203 To allow the owner to waive the warrant requirement was,
therefore, to allow him to waive the rights of the employees whose per-
sons were the subjects of the search. Such a result seems absurd on its
face in light of the Court's recognition that employees hold a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their workplace, which cannot logically dissolve
at the moment of the employer's consent.2 14 Moreover, the Court's pre-
vious decisions regarding third party standing to consent to search and
seizure have generally required that the consenting party hold some pro-
prietary or possessory interest in both the premises searched and the item
seized,2 °5 or that the consenting party has been given implied or express
200. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 643 (9th Cir.
1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
201. The Court generally will not invalidate on equal protection grounds a statute neutral
on its face absent proof that the enacting body was motivated by discriminatory intent. Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-68 (1981).
202. One possible resolution to the problem would be to restrict INS interrogation to those
individuals whose physical appearance substantially resembles that of particular illegal aliens
previously suspected of being on the premises. Note, supra note 177, at 633-34.
203. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
204. See INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1774 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting): "The mere
fact that the employer has consented to the entry of the INS onto his property does not mean
that the workers' expectation of privacy evaporates." See also supra note 165 and accompany-
ing text and infra, note 230 and accompanying text.
205. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (landlord cannot consent to warrant-
less search of tenant's premises even if landlord has right of entry to clean or to inspect);
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (search of defendant's hotel room without warrant
but with consent of hotel clerk violated defendant's fourth amendment rights despite hotel
management's proprietary interest in room).
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authority by the subject of the search to waive his right to object.2 ° 6
Neither of these conditions was fulfilled in the Delgado case, however.
The factory owner clearly could have no proprietary interest in the per-
sons of the workers, which were the "items" to be seized. If he could not
consent to the search of property wholly owned by his employees, he
should not be allowed to consent to the search for their persons. Nor had
the employees authorized the owner to waive their rights, unless such a
waiver is to be inferred from the fact of their employment.20 7 Moreover,
the employer would have no standing to assert the constitutional rights of
the employees detained on his premises when he was not himself de-
tained;20 8 a fortiori, he should not have standing to waive his employees'
rights to object to such a detention.
Beyond its weak legal foundation, the Court's acceptance of the em-
ployer's consent as a valid waiver of the workers' right to object to war-
rantless interrogation fails on a number of logical levels. First, the
employer should not be allowed to consent away his employees' objec-
tions because, unlike the workers against whom the interrogation is to be
targeted, the employer has no reason to object to the agents' entry. An
employer cannot be held liable under existing federal law for employing
illegal aliens.209 He may, however, be subjected to retaliatory raids if he
refuses to consent and forces INS agents to come back with a warrant.210
Indeed, one employers' association has warned factory owners that they
206. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (defendant's wife's consent to search
of house valid because sharing of living quarters gave wife implied authority to waive defend-
ant's objections).
207. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this issue, the general rule
is that an employer can consent only to the search of property used by the employee in connec-
tion with the work of the office. LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law...
Has Not... Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 320. See United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d
1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (official superior of government employee could not consent to search of
employee's desk for purse or other personal belongings).
208. Garcia v. INS, No. 81-F-680, slip op. at 8, 23, 25 (D. Colo. Nov. 4, 1982) (employer
cannot assert employees' fourth amendment rights). See also Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1765:
"Respondents may only litigate what happened to them .... "
209. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1324 prohibits the bringing in or harboring of illegal aliens, hiring
illegals does not constitute harboring them under the law. See supra note 176. Moreover,
Congress has consistently rejected proposals to sanction employers as a method of immigration
law enforcement. See Note, supra note 177, at 621 n.97. See also Jost, Immigration Problems
Not Easily Swept Away, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 23, 1984, at 2, col. 6 (noting bill pending before the
House of Representatives which would impose penalties on employers who knowingly hire
illegal aliens); Id., Apr. 24, 1984, at 4, col. 1 ("[TIhe raids are no substitute for the immigra-
tion-policy reform that Congress alone can provide[, such as] ... the long-stymied Simpson-
Mazzoli bill, which would grant amnesty to illegals who have been here longest and would
punish employers (albeit less severely than originally proposed) who hire those who do not
qualify for amnesty.").
210. Note, supra note 177, at 619 n.89.
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are better off allowing warrantless entry of their premises, as to antago-
nize agents could result in their factories' "receiving the regular attention
of the INS." '211
A second logical flaw in the position that an employer's consent may
operate to waive workers' rights arises from the employer's bargaining
position vis-a-vis his employees. The threat of calling in the immigration
authorities is a powerful economic weapon for an employer who knows
that his workers, or members of their immediate families, are of question-
able citizenship status. The workers' bargaining power is in this way
weakened, resulting in lower wages and substandard working condi-
tions.212 Thus, to grant to an employer the authority to waive his em-
ployees' objections to INS entry of their workplace is to empower him to
use the workers' fear of unreasonable governmental intrusion for his own
economic gain. Surely such a result was worthy of the Delgado Court's
attention in its analysis of the factory raids' fourth amendment
implications.
B. Legal and Factual Misrepresentations
The application of the relevant legal precedent to the facts of this
case may follow either of two analytical paths. On the one hand, the
factory surveys may be considered to be similar to the Border Patrol
stops at issue in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte2 1 and United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce 21 and may therefore be evaluated under the standards
formulated in those cases. Alternatively, the surveys may be analogized
to the investigative interrogations in Florida v. Royer,21 United States v.
Mendenhall216 and Brown v. Texas,217 and analyzed accordingly. Either
211. A January 1982 memorandum circulated to employers by the California Furniture
Manufacturers' Association warned:
INS officers may come to your plant either with or without a search warrant. If
they do not have a warrant, you have no legal obligation to admit them. But... [i]f
you force them to secure a search warrant, you will create an adversary role for
yourself vis-a-vis INS which may work to your disadvantage and could result in your
receiving the regular attention of the INS. Logically, then, it is advisable to admit
inspectors to your premises whether or not they have a search warrant.
See Note, supra note 177, at 619 n.89. See also Comment, supra note 191, at 641 n.51.
212. Comment, supra note 191, at 648-49 n.88 (citing 128 CONG. REC. S10,310 (daily ed.
Aug. 12, 1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) and SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY IMMI-
GRATION REFORM AND CONTROL, S. REP. No. 485, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-26 (1982)).
213. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
214. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
215. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
216. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
217. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
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mode of analysis, however, compels a conclusion different from that
reached by the majority of the Court.
1. Analysis under border stop standards
What has emerged from the Court's reasoning in each of the border
stop cases is a balancing of the government's interest in the stopping pro-
cedure against the stop's intrusion upon the individual.218 This balanc-
ing test evaluates not so much whether the stop constitutes a seizure
implicating the fourth amendment, but whether the ,stop is reasonable, so
that the fourth amendment-if implicated-is not violated.2 19 Where
the public interest is great and the intrusion minimal, as in the fixed
checkpoint stop in Martinez-Fuerte, the stop may be reasonable even ab-
sent specific and articulable facts warranting suspicion that the car con-
tains illegal aliens.220 Where the intrusion upon the individual is more
substantial, however, as in the roving patrol stop in Brignoni-Ponce, par-
ticularized suspicion is required.2 '
The high degree of intrusion found in Brignoni-Ponce was a function
of two factors, each of which is also present in the factory surveys at
issue in Delgado. The first of these factors is the "broad and unlimited
discretion" '222 that immigration law enforcement officers enjoy when they
are allowed to detain individuals for questioning without any objective
reason to suspect them of misconduct. The Court in Brignoni-Ponce de-
clared that to grant such discretion to the Border Patrol officers who
patrol the roads near the border would be to "subject the residents of
these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use
of the highways." '23 Similarly, to allow the INS full discretion in con-
ducting its surveys of factories in areas frequented by illegal aliens is to
subject local citizens and lawful resident aliens to unchecked intrusion
upon their privacy and security within their workplace. Were a Border
Patrol officer allowed to justify his stop, and an INS agent his interroga-
tion, upon the single factor cited in both Brignoni-Ponce and Delgado-
the questioned individual's "apparent Mexican ancestry ' '224 -the fourth
amendment rights of the large numbers of native-born and naturalized
citizens who have the physical characteristics identified with Mexican
218. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-58.
219. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878.
220. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545.
221. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 876.
222. Id. at 882.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 885-87; INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1772 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting
in part).
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ancestry would be continually violated. Such a result would be constitu-
tionally intolerable, for, as the Court in Brignoni-Ponce recognized, the
power under which Congress regulates the admission of aliens "cannot
diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken
for aliens." '225 And yet such a diminution of rights is exactly what the
majority ruling in Delgado will entail.
The second factor which contributed to the high level of intrusion in
Brignoni-Ponce and in Delgado is the element of surprise. In distinguish-
ing a stop at a fixed checkpoint from a roving patrol stop such as that in
Brignoni-Ponce, the Court in Martinez-Fuerte noted that although the
stopping procedure was the same in a checkpoint stop as in a roving one,
"the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on the
part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint
stop. ' 226 The motorists' fear is reduced because "they know, or may
obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be
stopped elsewhere. ' 227 Where the individual has no advance warning,
however, as in a Brignoni-Ponce roving stop or a surprise factory raid,
the unexpected police contact may cause concern or fear in even the most
reasonable individual. Where this fear is experienced by an entire group
of individuals, as it was in each of the factories during the INS surveys,
each individual's concern can only be heightened. As one of the respon-
dents testified: "'[N]ormally you get nervous when you see everybody is
scared, everybody is nervous.' 1,228
The element of surprise inherent in the factory surveys substantially
increases the procedure's intrusiveness. The balance of the public inter-
est in conducting the surveys against the workers' interest in personal
privacy and security should, therefore, swing in favor of the individual.
Consequently, in Delgado, as in Brignoni-Ponce, particularized suspicion
of misconduct should have been required to justify the interference with
the individual's rights. Where no such suspicion is demonstrated, as is
the case with the factory raid process, the procedure should be invali-
dated as violative of the fourth amendment.
Because the factors the Court used to distinguish an unreasonable
roving patrol stop from a reasonable checkpoint stop-surprise and ex-
cessive official discretion-are present in the factory survey procedure,
the surveys seem more clearly analogous to the roving patrols than to the
225. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
226. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
227. Id. at 559.
228. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1770 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Appellant's Brief
at 121 (testimony of respondent Miramontes)).
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fixed checkpoint stops. Therefore, the Court should, under Brignoni-
Ponce, have found the surveys in Delgado to be unreasonable under the
fourth amendment in the absence of articulable suspicion of individual
misconduct. Assuming arguendo that the surveys were found to be more
similar to the checkpoint stops than to the roving patrols, however, the
reasoning by which the Court upheld the stops at the fixed checkpoints
would be insufficient to justify the detentions in the case at hand. The
Martinez-Fuerte Court's rationale for allowing the checkpoint stops was
based in large part upon its recognition that the expectation of privacy in
one's automobile, which is relatively open to public view, is significantly
less than that in one's home.229 The Court has, however, acknowledged
a meaningful expectation of privacy in one's workplace, even if shared
with other employees.2 3 The workers in this case were interrogated in
their place of business, which was open to other employees but was not
within public view. Thus the intrusion they suffered as a result of the
INS surveys was substantially greater than that suffered by motorists
stopped by the Border Patrol. Under the Martinez-Fuerte balancing test,
therefore, the intrusion upon the individual workers' rights seems to out-
weigh the government's interest in conducting the surveys. This compels
the conclusion that the survey procedure is unreasonable under the
fourth amendment.
2. Analysis as investigative interrogation
Analyzing the factory surveys not as border stops but as investiga-
tive interrogations, in the mold of Brown, Mendenhall and Royer, also
compels the conclusion that the surveys were unreasonable. Under this
analysis, whether the fourth amendment is implicated by a particular en-
counter depends primarily upon the state of mind of the questioned indi-
vidual; that is, upon whether the circumstances surrounding the
questioning were such that a reasonable person in the same position
would have believed that he was not free to leave.231
Although police questioning does not in itself constitute fourth
amendment seizure, a questioned individual may in fact be seized when
certain factors are present to produce a reasonable belief that an answer
will be compelled.2 32 Among the factors considered by the Court to indi-
cate a seizure are "the threatening presence of several officers, the display
of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
229. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561.
230. See Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
231. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1983).
232. Id.
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citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance
with the officer's request might be compelled.
2 3
Many of these factors were present in Delgado. The record discloses
that a large number of agents, generally between fifteen and twenty-five
per factory, were employed in each survey.2" 4 The agents carried weap-
ons, although these were not drawn.2"' Handcuffs were used to detain
those workers who were suspected of being illegal aliens.236 At least one
of the workers, respondent Labontes, was physically touched by the
agents performing the interrogation.237 The workers commonly ob-
served detained co-workers being handcuffed and led to a van outside the
factory.238 All of these factors, coupled with the methodical execution of
the survey-in which agents proceed down the rows of workers, flash
their badges and ask pointed questions239-and the large number of ar-
rests made in each factory,2" ° added up to an environment in which a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.
Moreover, the presence of the agents at the doors of the factory
could only have made workers feel that their liberty was restrained. De-
spite the Court's insistence that the "obvious purpose" of these agents'
positioning was "to insure that all persons in the factories were ques-
tioned," '241 logic requires the recognition that such insurance could be
obtained only by detaining on the premises those workers who had not
yet been questioned. Indeed, the trial court found that the agents were
stationed at the entrances and exits "in order to prevent persons from
leaving the workplace" 242 -a finding which, on appeal, was accepted by
all the parties when they agreed that no material facts were in dispute.
243
Thus, the majority Justices' reinterpretation of the purpose of the agents
at the factory doors seems procedurally improper.
Even assuming that the Court properly reconsidered this factual is-
sue, however, it should not have focused upon the INS' subjective intent
in placing agents at the doors. Instead, the Court should have examined
233. Id.
234. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1770 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
235. Id. at 1760.
236. Id. at 1770 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
237. The agent approached Labontes from behind, tapped her on the shoulder, and asked
her where her papers were. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
238. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
239. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
240. See supra notes 14 & 122 and accompanying text.
241. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1763.
242. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 626.27 (9th
Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
243. Id. at 629.
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the inferences a reasonable person would draw when observing the
agents so positioned.2" Given the other circumstances outlined above
and the psychological environment these factors must have created, it
seems clear that a reasonable worker might well have believed that the
agents at the exits were there to prevent workers from leaving the area.
The manner in which the Court applied the Mendenhall "reasonable
belief' analysis seems inappropriate in other respects as well. The Del-
gado Court stated:
The record indicates that the INS agents' conduct in this case
consisted simply of questioning employees and arresting those
they had probable cause to believe were unlawfully present in
the factory. This conduct should have given respondents no
reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truth-
ful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply re-
fused to answer....
• . . Since most workers could have had no reasonable fear
that they would be detained upon leaving, we conclude that the
work forces as a whole were not seized.245
This language is problematic in two respects. First, to assert that no
seizure occurs when an individual is capable of ending the police contact
by giving a truthful answer is to say that the fourth amendment protects
only the guilty; that is, the fourth amendment is never implicated when
an innocent person is interrogated, as he can extricate himself from the
interrogation simply by telling the truth. Alternatively, to require that a
worker give a truthful answer in order to be left alone is to require that
he be able to show himself to be free of all wrongdoing in order to assert
his rights. This is to imply that the fourth amendment protects only the
innocent. For the Supreme Court to so limit an individual's constitu-
tional freedoms, even by implication through a curious turn of phrase, is
a chilling development clearly unsupported by the precedents cited in the
Delgado majority opinion.
Finally, the reasonableness of an investigative interrogation-like
the reasonableness of a Border Patrol stop--depends upon a balance be-
tween the public interest in the interrogation and the interference it
causes with the individual's freedom. As the Court in Brown v. Texas
246
stated:
The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a
244. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
245. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1763-64 (emphasis added).
246. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
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traditional arrest depends "on a balance between the public in-
terest and the individual's right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers." . . . In the absence of
any basis for suspecting [an individual] of misconduct, the bal-
ance between the public interest and [the individual's] right to
personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from po-
lice interference.
2 47
The powerful societal interest in certain types of investigative stops,
however, does not affect the mandate of the fourth amendment. The
Texas statute under which the defendant in Brown was required to iden-
tify himself was "designed to advance a weighty social objective in large
metropolitan centers: prevention of crime." '2 48 Similarly, the federal
statute which purports to grant to INS agents the authority to question
without a warrant those persons whom they have reason to believe are
illegal aliens249 is designed to facilitate the monumental objective of
checking the tide of illegal aliens entering this country. But as the Court
reasoned in Brown:
[E]ven assuming that [the avowed social] purpose is served to
some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an
individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved
in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment
do not allow it. When such a stop is not based on objective
criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practice exceeds
tolerable limits.
250
Because the INS' questioning of individual workers was based upon
no objective criteria, this language is as easily applied to the facts of Del-
gado as to those of Brown. Because neither of the warrants in Delgado
purporting to justify the factory surveys named individual workers sus-
pected of being illegal aliens nor contained specific facts giving rise to a
suspicion of misconduct on the part of any particular worker, the risk of
abuse which the Brown Court warned against can only be presumed to
have been excessively high.
VI. CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated, the factory surveys at issue in Delgado
were unreasonable under any relevant analysis. That they were nonethe-
247. Id. at 50-52 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)).
248. Id. at 52.
249. See supra note 193.
250. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52.
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less upheld would imply that the Court was determined to reach a
particular conclusion and therefore did so, contrary precedent notwith-
standing. Given the magnitude of the problems currently plaguing immi-
gration authorities, it seems fair to assume that the Court ruled as it did
in Delgado because it wished to facilitate immigration law enforcement
procedures to the fullest. However, to serve that undeniably legitimate
end by means of an intellectually dishonest misapplication of legal prece-
dents and an unwarranted, effectively racist restriction of constitutional
protection is to misuse the Court's power and authority.
The Supreme Court's decision in Delgado clearly indicates a willing-
ness on the part of a majority of the Justices to sacrifice the constitutional
rights of citizens and aliens alike in an effort to strengthen this nation's
flawed immigration law enforcement system. This willingness may flow
from the Justices' belief that they can effectively cure the system's ills at a
lesser cost and in a shorter time than could Congress. Whatever its moti-
vation, however, the Delgado ruling will have the effect of placing the
entire burden of immigration law enforcement upon the privacy and per-
sonal security interests of citizens and lawful resident aliens of Mexican
descent. No matter how noble or pragmatic the intent, such an outcome
is unjustifiable.
One of the raids at issue in Delgado was not supported by a warrant
but was conducted pursuant to the factory owner's consent. Under pres-
ent federal law, that factory owner bore no liability whatsoever for hav-
ing hired illegal aliens. Only the workers themselves were subject to
prosecution by immigration authorities. Still, the factory owner was al-
lowed to waive the workers' objections to the unreasonable intrusion of a
warrantless INS raid. This result, unsupportable under any of the
Court's previous decisions, was accepted without comment.
It is not the proper function of the Court to issue legally unsupport-
able rulings so as to strengthen ineffective legislation. Rather, Congress
must act to reform or replace its own impotent laws. Unless and until
Congress enacts legislation to impose sanctions upon the employers who
currently profit by hiring illegal aliens at miniscule wages, but who are
not subject to liability for having induced those aliens to cross the border,
this ineffectual, unjust and ethnically biased current immigration law sys-
tem seems likely to continue. With such a powerful entity as the highest
court in the land advocating and actively supporting this system's perpet-
uation, the injustices inherent in our present immigration policy can only
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become more firmly and irretrievably entrenched within our laws and
our national consciousness.
Meghan Kathleen Dooner
